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Morocco’s	   reform	   process	   has	   passed	   through	   four	   phases	   since	   early	   2011.	   In	   each	   of	   these	  
phases,	   debates	   about	   rights	   have	   been	   centre-­‐stage.	   Both	   advances	   and	   blockages	   have	   been	  
witnessed	   in	  relation	  to	  rights,	  but	  definitions	  of	  preferred	  concepts	  of	  rights	  by	   local	  Moroccan	  
actors	  remain	  fluid.	  
	  
The	   first	   defining	   moment	   can	   be	   labeled	   one	   of	   contestation.	   Unfolding	   after	   a	   call	   for	  
democratization	  launched	  online	  by	  three	  bloggers	  in	  late	  January	  2010,	  an	  alliance	  of	  youngsters	  
and	   grassroots	   organizations	   gathered	   peacefully	   in	   over	   fifty	   cities	   on	   the	   20	   February	   and	  
mobilized	  even	  more	  successfully	  in	  the	  months	  thereafter,	  voicing	  socio-­‐economic	  concerns.	  This	  
movement,	  known	  as	  the	  20	  February	  movement	  (M20F),	  acted	  as	  a	  platform	  pushing	  for	  change.	  
It	  was	  inspired	  not	  only	  by	  events	  in	  Tunisia,	  Egypt	  and	  elsewhere	  but	  as	  much	  by	  a	  local	  context	  
and	  a	  long	  legacy	  of	  domestic	  social	  struggles.	  Though	  it	  was	  not	  overtly	  targeted,	  this	  represented	  
the	  most	  serious	  challenge	  to	  the	  monarchy	  under	  King	  Mohammed	  VI.	  A	  second	  phase	  was	  the	  
royal	   response	   to	   these	   requests	   and	   demonstrations,	  which	   came	   on	   in	   the	   form	  of	   a	   historic	  
speech	   in	  March	  2011	   in	  which	   the	  King	  promised	  constitutional	   reform.	  This	  phase	  came	  to	  an	  
end	  when	  a	  nationwide	  referendum	  convincingly	  approved	  the	  new	  Constitution	  in	  July	  2011	  and	  
the	  nation	  subsequently	  appointed	  a	  new	  parliament	  in	  elections	  in	  November	  2011.	  
	  
The	  formation	  in	  January	  2012	  of	  a	  four	  party	  coalition	  government	  led	  by	  the	  moderate	  Islamist	  
Party	  for	  Justice	  and	  Development	  (PJD)	  allowed	  for	  a	  third	  phase	  of	  prudent	  optimism.	  Optimism	  
was	  merited	  especially	  in	  comparison	  with	  transition	  difficulties	  witnessed	  in	  other	  North	  African	  
countries.	  By	  then,	  however,	  a	  standoff	  was	  already	  underway	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  
Palace.	  Together	  with	  concerns	  over	  economic	  performance,	   this	  gave	  way	  to	  a	   fourth	  and	   final	  
phase	  of	  increasing	  frustration	  and	  infighting	  among	  cabinet	  members	  resulting	  in	  a	  growing	  sense	  
of	  deadlock	  and	  procrastination.	  
	  
This	  policy	  brief	  looks	  at	  the	  major	  developments	  during	  these	  four	  phases,	  in	  terms	  of	  decisions,	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  citizenship.	   It	   discusses	   the	   most	   notable	   accomplishments;	   then	   setbacks	   and	   failures	   to	  




The	   single	   most	   significant	   change	   in	   Morocco	   since	   2010	   has	   been	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   new	  
constitution.	  A	  lot	  has	  been	  said	  and	  written	  about	  this	  constitutional	  reform,	  which	  resulted	  from	  
the	   recommendations	   formulated	   by	   a	   special	   commission	   of	   experts	   appointed	   by	   the	   King.	  
Although	  critics	  were	  quick	  to	  lament	  that	  the	  changes	  do	  not	  go	  far	  enough,	  the	  new	  Constitution	  
does	  introduce	  some	  substantial	  new	  elements:	  the	  King	  is	  bound	  to	  name	  as	  head	  of	  government	  
a	  member	  of	   the	  party	  that	  won	  the	  elections	  and	  the	  powers	  of	   the	  prime	  minister	   (in	  naming	  
and	   replacing	   ministers)	   are	   considerably	   strengthened,	   as	   are	   the	   prerogatives	   of	   the	  
parliament’s	  president.	  	  
	  
Several	   new	   bodies	   are	   set	   up	   to	   protect	   and	   develop	   individual	   rights.	   Articles	   19	   to	   40	   are	  
devoted	  to	  liberties	  and	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  the	  very	  word	  ‘liberty’	  occurs	  36	  times	  in	  the	  new	  
Constitution,	  compared	  to	  nine	  in	  the	  previous	  version	  of	  1996.	  Furthermore,	  the	  equality	  of	  “civil,	  
political,	  economic,	  social,	  cultural	  and	  environmental	  rights	  and	  liberties	  of	  men	  and	  women”	  is	  
enshrined	  in	  article	  19.	  
	  
Also,	   tellingly,	   the	   uniquely	  Moroccan	   definition	   of	   the	   King	   as	   the	   Commander	   of	   the	   Faithful	  
(amir	  al-­‐muminin)	   is	  henceforth	  separated	  from	  his	  role	  as	  the	  head	  of	  state.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  
the	   transformation	   of	   one	   previous	   article	   into	   two	   new	   ones:	   one	   (article	   41)	   stipulating	   the	  
King’s	   exclusive	   prerogatives	   pertaining	   to	   the	   imarat	   al-­‐muminin	   institution	   and	   a	   second	   one	  
(article	   42)	   defining	   his	   role	   as	   head	   of	   state.	   Besides,	   an	   Economic,	   Social	   and	   Environmental	  
Council	   is	   set	   up	   (article	   151)	   and,	   last	   but	   not	   least,	   a	   (partly	   elected,	   partly	   appointed)	  
Constitutional	   Court	   is	   established	   (article	   129)	  which	   can	   be	   used	   by	   any	   citizen	   engaged	   in	   a	  
judicial	  process.	  
	  
On	  a	  different	  level,	  the	  issue	  of	  linguistic	  rights	  received	  considerable	  attention	  and,	  in	  line	  with	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previous	  initiatives	  such	  a	  dedicated	  institute	  (IRCAM),	  Tamazight,	  the	  Berber	  language	  spoken	  by	  
a	  majority	  of	  Moroccans,	  has	  now	  been	  granted	  the	  status	  of	  an	  official	  language	  (article	  5).	  This	  is	  
a	  major	  step	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  ethno-­‐cultural	  pluralism.	  Finally,	  petitioning	  rights	  were	  secured	  
(article	  15)	  and	  Moroccans	  residing	  abroad	  were	  given	  full	  citizenship	  rights	  (article	  17),	  including	  
the	  right	  to	  vote	  and	  to	  be	  elected.	  Foreigners	  residing	   in	  Moroccan	  are	  allowed	  to	  vote	   in	   local	  
elections	  (article	  30).	  
	  
What	  essentially	  occurred	  was	   that	  new	  pressures	   for	  change	   led	   the	  King	   to	   introduce	   reforms	  
that	  had	  been	  lingering	  and	  his	  rapid	  response,	  skillfully	  communicated,	  suggests	  that	  the	  reforms	  
had	  been	  lying	  on	  a	  shelf	  for	  quite	  some	  time	  as	  a	  remedy	  to	  stem	  major	  political	  unrest.	  What	  is	  
more,	  by	  advancing	  the	  new	  Constitution,	  the	  Makhzen	  (literally,	  the	  storehouse,	  figuratively,	  the	  
pervasiveness	   of	   opaque	   Moroccan	   officialdom)	   absorbed	   and	   co-­‐opted	   the	   protests	   in	   a	  
successful	  bid	  to	  gain	  back	  the	  upper	  hand.	  
	  
Of	   course,	   the	  mere	   inclusion	   of	   a	   right	   into	   a	   constitution	   does	   not	   guarantee	   that	   it	   will	   be	  
enjoyed	  in	  practice.	  One	  precondition	  is	  parliamentary	  progress:	  a	  long	  trail	  of	  paperwork	  must	  be	  
accomplished	  before	  a	  constitution	  becomes	  enforceable	  on	  the	  ground	  by	  virtue	  of	  organic	  laws	  
and	  decrees.	  Many	  of	  those	  pertaining	  to	  the	  2011	  Constitution	  are	  still	  being	  awaited.	  It	  has	  been	  
estimated	  that,	  even	  if	  all	  parliamentarians	  agreed	  on	  the	  order	  of	  priorities,	   it	  would	  take	  a	  full	  
legislature	   to	   transform	   the	   constitution	   into	   laws	   in	   order	   to	  make	   it	   felt	   on	   the	   ground.	   Even	  
then	  a	  constitution	  translated	  into	  a	  coherent	  legal	  framework	  would	  still	  be	  insufficient	  without	  
further	   support.	   Indeed,	   there	   is	   also	   the	   question	   of	   strengthening	   legal	   culture	   throughout	  
society,	  conditioned	  by	  citizens	  capable	  of	  claiming	  their	  rights	  and	  of	  officers	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  
enforce	  measures.	  	  
	  
In	   short,	   for	   the	   time	  being,	   the	   new	  Constitution	   is	   a	   norm	  and	   an	   ideal	   but	   hardly	   a	   tangible	  
reality	   in	   contemporary	   Moroccan	   society.	   Staunch	   pessimists	   might	   even	   add	   that,	   on	   the	  
contrary,	  it	  has	  essentially	  been	  a	  public	  relations	  exercise.	  
	  
In	  addition	   to	   the	  Constitution,	   several	  other	  changes	  deserve	  a	  mention.	  A	  national	   council	   for	  
human	  rights	  (CNDH)	  was	  established	  in	  March	  2011,	  not	  technically	  as	  part	  of	  the	  constitutional	  
reform	  but	   in	  a	  preexistent	   initiative	  to	   invigorate	  a	  hitherto	  consultative	  body.	  Similarly,	  efforts	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have	   been	  made	   to	   have	   a	   long-­‐awaited	   fund	   (RAMED)	   for	  medical	   assistance	   to	   economically	  
vulnerable	  citizens	  and	  basic	  medical	  insurance	  operational	  as	  of	  2013.	  
	  
An	  innovation	  in	  terms	  of	  mobility	  rights	  was	  announced	  in	  June	  2013	  in	  the	  form	  of	  negotiations	  
for	   a	   new	   partnership	   with	   the	   EU.	   This	   agreement,	   designed	   to	   facilitate	   visa	   procedures	   for	  
Moroccan	  students,	  researchers	  and	  business	  people	  endows	  the	  country	  with	  the	  most	  favorable	  
treatment	   among	   southern	   Mediterranean	   countries.	   In	   return,	   Morocco	   will	   readmit	   illegal	  
immigrants	  who	  transited	  via	  Morocco	  to	  enter	  the	  EU,	  something	  Rabat	  had	  (officially)	  refused	  to	  




One	  of	  the	  issues	  not	  included	  in	  the	  2011	  Constitution	  was	  the	  freedom	  of	  conscience	  and	  belief.	  
Although	   the	   text	   does	   guarantee	   freedom	   of	   thought,	   opinion	   and	   expression	   in	   all	   its	   forms	  
(article	   25),	   at	   the	   behest	   of	   PJD	   pressure	   it	   does	   not	   include	   religious	   freedom.	   In	   spite	   of	   a	  
longstanding	  tradition	  of	  religious	  tolerance	  in	  Morocco,	  the	  freedom	  to	  leave	  or	  to	  change	  one’s	  
religion	  remains	  elusive.	  Proselytism	  is	  banned,	  except	  for	  those	  seeking	  to	  convert	  to	  Sunni	  Islam	  
of	  the	  Maliki	  school,	  by	  far	  the	  most	  dominant	  branch	  in	  the	  country.	  
	  
One	  feature	  specific	  to	  Morocco	  resides	  in	  having	  a	  King	  who,	  as	  commander	  of	  the	  faithful,	  can	  
defend	  and	  symbolize	   Islam	  and,	  as	   such,	   simultaneously	  guarantees	   freedom	  of	  worship	   for	  all	  
citizens.	  Yet	   this	  contrasts	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  penal	  code	  which	   identifies	  several	  un-­‐Islamic	  
practices	  –such	  as	  eating	  in	  public	  during	  Ramadan	  or	  premarital	  sex-­‐	  as	  punishable	  crimes.	  One	  
recent	  polemic	  erupted	  following	  a	  public	  outcry	  over	  the	  case	  of	  Amina	  Filali,	  a	  16-­‐year	  old	  girl	  
who	  committed	  suicide	  in	  2012	  after	  being	  forced	  to	  marry	  her	  rapist.	  
	  
Such	  dramas	  highlight	   the	   importance	  of	   recurrent	  calls	   for	   increasing	  women’s	  rights.	  Although	  
the	  Moroccan	  family	  code	  (moudawana)	  was	  reformed	  in	  2004	  to	  great	  international	  acclaim,	  its	  
application	   remains	   erratic.	   Notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   latest	   Constitution	   emphatically	  
consolidates	   women’s	   rights	   (article	   19)	   and	   although	   the	   same	   article	   establishes	   a	   special	  
authority	  to	  promote	  gender	  parity	  and	  to	  combat	  all	  forms	  of	  discrimination,	  a	  lot	  remains	  to	  be	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done	   for	   ordinary	   women	   to	   enjoy	   equality	   on	   daily	   basis,	   especially	   in	   rural	   areas.	   Their	  
participation	  in	  the	  labour	  market	   is	  among	  the	  lowest	   in	  the	  region.	   Interesting	   initiatives	  exist,	  
however,	   and	   they	   include	  new	   feminist	   interpretations	  of	   Islam	   that	   seek	   to	  empower	  women	  
from	  theological	  perspectives.	  
	  
Critics	  note	  the	  failure	  to	  advance	  on	  socio-­‐economic	  rights.	  Employment,	  housing	  and	  health	  care	  
are	   basic	   rights	   that,	   today,	   are	   far	   from	   secure	   throughout	   Moroccan	   society.	   Regarding	  
employment,	  a	  prominent	  issue	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  uprisings,	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  generate	  
new	  jobs	  by	  integrating	  some	  of	  the	  highly	  organized	  diplomés	  chômeurs	  (a	  movement	  of	  jobless	  
graduates	   who	   protest	   on	   a	   regular	   basis	   and	   are	   on	   a	   waiting	   list	   among	   government	  
administrations),	   to	   raise	   salaries	   of	   state	   officials	   and	   to	   activate	   state	   bureaucracies	   and	  
dependencies	  such	  as	  the	  phosphate	  giant	  OCP.	  The	  PJD	  also	  vowed	  to	  cap	  the	  salaries	  of	  top	  civil	  
servants.	  
	  
Meanwhile,	   a	   large	   informal	   economy	   exists	   as	   an	   essential	   source	   of	   revenue	   for	   many	  
households	  to	  make	  ends	  meet.	  Structurally,	  however,	  the	  problem	  of	  employment	   is	   intimately	  
linked	   to	   tackling	   illiteracy,	   which	   is	   now	   declining	   but	   is	   still	   at	   30	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   overall	  
population	  in	  2013).	  Some	  investments	  have	  been	  made	  in	  social	  housing	  projects	  and,	  spurred	  by	  
security	  concerns	   following	  several	  bombings,	   there	   is	  a	  clear	  commitment	   to	  eradicate	  slums	  –
although	  the	  problem	  is	  manifold	  and	  proves	  harder	  to	  solve	  than	  simply	  by	  building	  new	  housing	  
blocks.	  
	  
Another	  issue	  that	  has	  continued	  to	  stir	  debate	  is	  the	  power	  and	  abuse	  of	  central	  authorities.	  This	  
complex	   issue	   ranges	   from	   evidence	   of	   continuing	   repression	   and	   violence	   against	   political	  
opponents,	   restrictions	   on	   press	   freedom	   and	   requests	   for	   curbing	   royal	   privileges.	   For	   all	   his	  
widened	  powers,	  the	  prime	  minister	  is	  still	  largely	  dependent	  on	  the	  King,	  who	  remains	  a	  powerful	  
head	  of	  state	  with	  far-­‐reaching	  prerogatives.	  After	  all,	  the	  new	  Constitution	  characterizes	  Morocco	  
as	  a	  constitutional	  monarchy,	  not	  as	  a	  parliamentary	  monarchy.	  Despite	  the	  release	  of	  some	  190	  
political	  prisoners	  (mostly	  Islamists)	   in	  April	  2011,	  reports	  on	  brutal	  handling	  by	  security	  services	  
has	  not	  disappeared	  –some	  say	  that,	   in	  fact,	  after	  a	   lull	   in	  2011,	  repression	  (for	  example	  against	  
the	   M20F)	   increased	   notably	   from	   2012	   onwards,	   especially	   after	   the	   installation	   of	   the	   new	  
government	   and	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   Adl	  wa-­‐l	   Ihsan	   (the	   influential,	   semi-­‐clandestine	   Justice	   and	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Charity	  Association)	  as	  a	  major	  pillar	  of	  the	  M20F	  in	  December	  2011.	  This	  reveals	  how	  two	  political	  
blocs	  are	  now	  pitted	  against	  each	  other.	  
	  
Indeed,	   the	   stalemate	   between	   the	   royal	   palace	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   government	   on	   the	  
other	   helps	   to	   understand	   how	   change	   is	   being	   promoted,	   managed	   and	   resisted.	   The	   rapid	  
reaction	  of	  the	  King	  and	  the	  canny	  crisis	  management	  of	  the	  Palace	  allowed,	  thanks	  to	  a	  well-­‐oiled	  
state	  machinery,	  for	  an	  efficient	  counter-­‐initiative	  that	  quelled	  a	  phase	  of	  contestations.	  Once	  the	  
referendum	   had	   been	   approved	   and	   the	   elections	   were	   successfully	   held,	   the	   King	   took	   full	  
advantage	   of	   the	   privileges	   granted	   to	   him	   and	   successively	   appointed	   a	   number	   of	   personal	  
counselors,	   effectively	  mounting	   a	   shadow	   cabinet	   even	   before	   the	   new	   government	   had	   been	  
installed.	   This	   team	   of	   seasoned	   political	   advisors	   (including	   a	   deputy	  minister	   for	   interior	   and	  
foreign	  affairs)	  provides	  the	  King	  with	  a	  pool	  of	  expertise	  and	  experience	  that	  puts	  him	  well	  ahead	  
of	  any	  competing	  actors	  and	  allows	  him	  to	  dominate	  the	  political	  scene.	  In	  a	  symbolic	  exhibition	  of	  
power,	   he	   unilaterally	   appointed	   a	   series	   of	   diplomatic	   representatives	   only	   days	   after	   the	  
parliamentary	  elections.	  
	  
From	  its	  side,	  the	  incoming	  government	  –led	  for	  the	  first	  time	  ever	  by	  an	  Islamist	  party-­‐	  was	  eager,	  
especially	   during	   its	   first	   months	   in	   power,	   to	   score	   points	   of	   its	   own	   in	   order	   to	   show	   its	  
determination	   and	   pugnacity.	   Having	   secured	   several	   key	   ministerial	   posts	   including	   some	  
sovereign	  portfolios	  previously	  entrusted	  to	  royal	  appointees	  (including	  foreign	  affairs	  and	  justice),	  
PJD	  ministers	  pushed	  through	  initiatives	  –such	  as	  the	  shock	  publication	  of	  a	  list	  of	  (royally	  granted)	  
transport	   licenses	   (grimas)-­‐	   to	   signal	  a	   rigorous	  attitude	   towards	  corruption	  and	  what	   it	   sees	  as	  
moral	   decadence.	  Measures	  were	   announced	   against	   alcohol	   sales,	   to	   reform	   programming	   on	  
state	   television	   and	   to	   enforce	   stricter	   controls	   on	   adoption	   (kafala)	   of	   Moroccan	   orphans	   by	  
foreigners	   in	  a	  bid	  against	   child	  abuse.	   Some	  of	   these	  measures	   implied	  a	   certain	   illiberalism	   in	  
terms	  of	  rights.	  
	  
Besides,	   the	   more	   outspoken	   elements	   among	   Islamist	   forces	   and	   within	   the	   three	   other	  
governmental	  parties	  are	  also	  kept	  in	  check	  by	  the	  imperatives	  and	  constraints	  of	  coalition	  politics	  
–a	  result	  of	  the	  proportional	  electoral	  system.	  The	  current	  government	  crisis	  highlights	  this.	  Thus,	  
WHO IS PUSHING FOR/OBSTRUCTING CHANGE 
 
	          EUSPRING - ARAB CITIZENSHIP REVIEW N. 2 
 
prime	  minister	  Benkirane	  finds	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  implement	  tough	  decisions	  on	  urgent	  matters	  and	  
sensitive	   issues	   (subsidy	   policies,	   pension	   reform	   and	   trade).	   Many	   decisions	   are	   postponed.	  
Alternatively,	   the	  PJD	  pushes	   forward	  and	   finds	   itself	   accused	  of	  monopolizing	  decision-­‐making.	  
The	   government	   is	   unlikely	   to	   act	   in	   any	   field	   that	   would	   hit	   the	   cost	   of	   living	   and	   purchasing	  
power	  of	  ordinary	  citizens.	  Whereas	   such	  compromised	  deal	  making	  wears	  out	   the	  government	  
parties,	  the	  King	  can	  limit	  himself	  to	  announcing	  positive	  decisions	  and	  development	  efforts.	  	  
	  
Equally	  important,	  capacity	  building	  among	  parliamentarians	  remains	  a	  necessary	  point	  of	  action.	  	  
Political	   parties,	   many	   of	   whom	   run	   their	   own	   newspapers	   and	   yield	   influence	   among	   social	  
partners	  lack	  political	  courage,	  remain	  weak	  and	  are	  prone	  to	  cooptation	  strategies.	  Raising	  their	  
efficiency	   is	   a	   key	   challenge	   if	   the	   role	   of	   political	   (but	   also	   economic,	   academic,	   media,	   civil	  
society)	  elites	  are	  to	  counterbalance	  top-­‐down	  initiatives	  effectively.	  Again,	  a	  new	  constitution	  is	  
not	  worth	  much	   if	   these	  actors	   fail	   to	  enact	  or	  adhere	   to	   it.	   Indeed,	   the	  King	  himself	  has	  urged	  
political	  parties	  to	  reinforce	  Moroccan	  democracy	  by	  fielding	  competent	  candidates	  and	  credible	  
electoral	  programs.	  A	  dynamic	  new	  president	  of	   the	  assembly	  of	   representatives	  has	   initiated	  a	  




In	  addition	  to	  its	  internal	  hybridity,	  the	  implosion	  of	  M20F	  –the	  main	  expression	  of	  protest	  in	  line	  
with	  revolts	  elsewhere-­‐	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  movement	  to	  transform	  its	  socio-­‐
economic	  agenda	  into	  a	  set	  of	  clear	  political	  demands,	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  by	  an	  effective	  response	  
of	  the	  Palace,	  most	  notably	  constitutional	  reform	  and	  early	  elections	  that	  brought	  an	  Islamists-­‐led	  
cabinet	  to	  power,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  
	  
Compared	   to	   other	   regimes	   throughout	   the	   region,	   the	   Palace’s	   inhibitions	   (as	   a	   traditional	  
defender	   of	   religious	   tolerance)	   towards	   Islamists	   have	   diminished	   significantly.	   The	   moderate	  
Islamists	   of	   PJD	   have	   plainly	   integrated	   into	   the	   political	   fray	   and	   they	   are	   now	   receiving	   the	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So	   far,	   this	   strategy	   seems	   to	  be	  working:	  while	   the	  executive	  and	   legislative	  actors	  have	  made	  
clear	  progress	  thanks	  to	  the	  new	  Constitution,	  the	  King	  seems	  to	  have	  given	  without	  having	  lost.	  
Although	   the	   constitutional	   changes	   are	   yet	   to	   be	   legally	   and	   politically	   consolidated,	   the	  most	  
cynical	  state	  administrators	  have	  had	  to	  restrain	  their	  actions.	  The	  Makhzen	  may	  have	  been	  forced	  
to	   reinstall	   a	   discourse	   of	   seduction	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   the	   initial	   years	   of	   King	  Mohammed	   VI’s	  
reign.	  	  
	  
This	   being	   said,	   the	  monarchy	   –after	   a	   short	   period	  of	   turbulence	   in	   2011-­‐	   outmaneuvered	   the	  
protest	  movement	  and	  now	  seems	  as	  strong	  as	  ever.	  The	  king	  rules	  and,	  when	  he	  wishes	  to,	  he	  
also	   governs.	   The	   government,	   for	   its	   part,	   is	   struggling	   to	   overcome	   a	   coalition	   crisis.	   This	  
outcome	   is	   all	   the	   more	   remarkable	   because	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   root	   causes	   of	   the	  
discontentment	  have	  not	  been	  resolved.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
